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Belief in free will is the general belief that human behavior is free
from internal and external constraints across situations for both self
and others. In the last decade, scholars in social‐cognitive psychol-
ogy and experimental philosophy have made progress in defining
free will terms, exploring how laypersons think of free will, discover-
ing related cognitive processes and biases, and examining the
behavioral outcomes of believing in free will. The growing interest
in this construct raises the need for a discussion of what is new
about free will beliefs, and how this construct differs from and
relates to other well‐known agency constructs in the literature. In
this review, we integrate conceptual discussions and empirical find-
ings in the existing literature to highlight the belief in free will as a
separate and important construct, different from existing constructs
in the literature, and capturing unique aspects of agency. We con-
clude by calling researchers to recognize these differences and to
leverage the potential in the construct of the belief in free will as
a predictor of cognition and behavior.
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The question of whether free will exists has fascinated mankind for over two millennia, with heated philosophical
debates among the greatest of human minds. To date, the debate is still far from any resolution. However, the last
decade has seen the emergence of a research literature based in social‐cognitive psychology and experimental philos-
ophy offering a fresh perspective on this ancient question by moving beyond a debate on the existence of free will to
the examination of laypersons’ understanding of the idea and related beliefs. At the center of inquiry is the lay‐beliefe Creative Commons Attribution‐NonCommercial License, which permits use, dis-
d the original work is properly cited and is not used for commercial purposes.
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2 of 15 FELDMANin free will which regards humans as agents that are capable of choosing freely regardless of external (e.g., environ-
ment, society, nature, God/s, and other agents) and internal (e.g., uncontrollable urges, needs, genes, and personality)
constraints. Research in this domain focuses on why people believe in free will, associated cognitive processes and
biases, and the consequences of endorsing such beliefs.
Over the course of the last decade, researchers have made significant progress in defining free will
(e.g., Haggard, Mele, O’Connor, & Vohs, 2010), assessing layperson’s understanding of the concept of free will
(e.g., Monroe & Malle, 2010; Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, & Turner, 2005), and developing scales to measure
beliefs in free will (Carey & Paulhus, 2013; Nadelhoffer, Shepard, Nahmias, Sripada, & Ross, 2014; Rakos, Steyer,
Skala, & Slane, 2008), with studies examining the consequences of the belief in free will for neurophysiological
mechanisms (Rigoni & Brass, 2014) and a wide array of psychological and behavioral outcomes (Baumeister &
Monroe, 2014). Despite the fast‐growing body of research, the advances in our understanding of the belief in
free will, and the accumulating evidence for its effects on cognition and behavior, some theoretical gaps remain.
The belief in free will is still a relatively new construct, often misunderstood or undervalued, and it is therefore
imperative to position this construct within the existing literature to clarify how the construct differs from and
complements other well‐studied constructs in the literature. So far, there have been only sporadic references to
the relationship between free will beliefs and other agency constructs, with no systematic theoretical overview
or a comparison to conceptually related constructs.
The purpose of this review is to outline the belief in free will as a unique and important construct. We provide a
brief introduction of the construct by clarifying what the belief in free will is and what it is not, and then discuss impor-
tant conceptual differences between the belief in free will and other well‐studied constructs (self‐efficacy, locus of
control, self‐esteem, self‐control, implicit beliefs, mind‐body dualism, autonomy, and intentionality) with references
to supporting empirical evidence.2 | WHAT BELIEF IN FREE WILL IS AND WHAT IT IS NOT
Belief in free will is the core abstract belief that people have the capacity to act freely (Haggard et al., 2010)
or put more simply that a person could have chosen to do otherwise (Nichols, 2004), both in the perception
that alternative options are available for the self to choose from and in the perceived ability for the self to
choose among these options freely without constraints (Kane, 2002, 2011)1. Possible constraints generally fall
into two categories: internal and external. In the category of external limitations for freedom are broad influ-
ences that include other agents (e.g., family, friends, and colleagues), the environment, society, norms, and much
broader factors, such as nature, fate (Au et al., 2011; Chan, Wan, & Sin, 2009), and even God, angels, and demons
(Fromm, 1941). These and other external factors are possible barriers to perceived free choice, such that – for example
– a person may perceive everything to be causally determined by the laws of nature or predestined by the rule of God
or the inevitability of fate, thus leaving humans and the self with no ability to choose. The second category of con-
straints involves internal factors that are about oneself. These factors include genes, personality, intelligence, urges,
needs, desires, physical disabilities, mental disorders, addictions, and other deterministic or uncontrollable factors.
For example, people may believe that genes predetermine their actions and future since birth, thus preventing them
from changing and limiting their choice to take actions atypical to their genetic predestination. People may also per-
ceive themselves to have less free will if they believe that they are incapable of controlling or overcoming their internal
urges, desires, or needs.
Although most cultures operate on the basis of some degree of belief in freedom of choice (Sarkissian et al.,
2010), people vary in the extent to which they regard human beings, including themselves, as having free will
(Baumeister, 2008a). Differences in the endorsement of the belief in free will are typically assessed using scales
emphasizing different aspects of the philosophical definition of free will (e.g., Paulhus & Carey, 2011; Stroessner
& Green, 1990; Rakos et al., 2008; Nadelhoffer et al., 2014). Yet with a concept so highly controversial and
FELDMAN 3 of 15abstract as free will scholars have realized the importance in also assessing how laypersons generally think about
and refer to free will (Monroe & Malle, 2010; Nichols, 2011). Monroe and Malle (2010) and Stillman, Baumeister,
and Mele (2011) both reported choice and unconstrained action as the most important factors in the way people
perceive free will, and Feldman, Baumeister, and Wong (2014) demonstrated strong cognitive links between the
concepts of choice and free‐will. While laypersons’ associations between free will and choice may seem straight-
forward, researchers previously simply assumed that people think of the concept of free will as something meta-
physical (Brembs, 2011; Cashmore, 2010; Greene & Cohen, 2004; Montague, 2008). Therefore, in both the
academic conceptualization and laypersons’ understanding, the concept of free will is not a magical metaphysical
notion, but rather a reference to choice, agency, and unconstrained action (Monroe, Dillon, & Malle, 2014; Mon-
roe & Malle, 2014; Nadelhoffer et al., 2014; Nahmias, Shepard, & Reuter, 2014).3 | THE PURPOSE OF FREE WILL
The prevalent endorsement of the belief in free will raises an important fundamental question – Why would anyone
believe in free will? If one believes in free will – then what is free will meant for?
One group of scholars views free will beliefs as a mechanism that allows the self to pursue self‐enhancing desired
states and goals and seek own wants and needs (Hume, 1748; Edwards, 1754). Put more simply – free will is only
worth having if it enables the individual to get what she or he wants (Dennett, 2003).
A second view often referred to as the “action‐control perspective” argues that the concept of free will has
evolved to allow the self to coexist with others in society as to override inherent immediate biological urges that
mainly focus on the self (Kant, 1797/1967) thus allowing for prospection, long‐term planning, action control, and
coordination with others in society (Baumeister, 2005, 2008a). The belief in free will could have possibly evolved
so that people would be able to a deal with a world of increasingly complicated choices and complex societal interac-
tions that require coordination and inhibition of self (Baumeister, 2008a; Laurene, Rakos, Tisak, Robichaud, & Horvath,
2011; Rakos et al., 2008).
The close conceptual relationship that free will holds with moral responsibility supports the view that free
will is a notion embedded in societal considerations. The concept of free will may be regarded by societies and
religions as a solution to the predicament of laypersons that associate determinism with inevitability, reduced
accountability, and thus lower action control over socially undesirable behaviors. Based on the idea of free will
as a social tool, the belief that a person could make different free choices in a given situation is considered
essential to legal, moral, and political judgments (Juth & Lorentzon, 2010; Searle, 2007). More broadly, society
often regards it appropriate to adjust legal and moral judgments based on the assessment of whether a wrong-
doer acted out of his or her own free will (Greene & Cohen, 2004; Roskies, 2006). In order to legally hold a per-
son accountable and bring a person to trial, it is now commonly expected that it be proven that the person could
have done otherwise, meaning that there were no external influences coercing the person to act in this way (e.g.,
having a gun to the person’s head) or that the person did not merely act out of uncontrollable urges (e.g., tem-
porary insanity; Burns & Bechara, 2007). Similarly, a contract between two people is only considered valid if the
two sides have entered the contract out of their own free will, meaning that both sides were free from any coer-
cion (Cohen, 1933).
A developmental perspective argues free will to be rooted in the perception people experience in their everyday
choices while growing up – even if such a perception is illusory, serving as a self‐indicator regarding the ability to exe-
cute and increasing one’s motivation to enter difficult choice situations (Bandura, 2006; Rakos, 2004; Wegner, 2004).
Nichols (2004) showed that children between the ages of three and five typically endorse free will and reject deter-
minism by making the claim that a person in a given scenario could have chosen to act differently, much more so than
a physical object could have. Nichols goes on further to argue that the perception of having free will in kids is innate
rather than learned – that freedom of an agent is inferred by native evidence to form the belief that humans are
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that not only do kids at the age of five perceive people to have the capacity to choose more freely than objects do but
that they also clearly distinguish between free and un‐free actions by the same human agent (Chernyak, Kushnir, &
Wellman, 2010; Kushnir, Wellman, & Chernyak, 2009).
To summarize, the role of free will in people’s beliefs could be the pursuit of own goals and desires or in the evo-
lutionary role of free will as overcoming self to allow people to coexist with others in society. This belief could also be
rooted in an innate intuitive perception developed by people while growing up to self‐motivate when faced with
making choices.4 | BELIEF IN FREE WILL AS A UNIQUE CONSTRUCT
Belief in free will captures a unique aspect of agency that has not been addressed by other constructs in the literature.
Our discussion of the unique attributes of the belief in free will is focused on the following dimensions: (a) construct
type – a belief, a trait, or an evaluation, (b) key factor – core underlying factor captured (choice, ability, worth, control,
etc.), (c) view of the person – a unified or nuanced view of the self, and (d) view of the environment – a unified or
nuanced view of the environment.
Below we review the construct of belief in free will on each of those dimensions. We address several well‐
known constructs previously conceptualized to capture agency and discuss how they are different from and are
related to the belief in free will. Specifically, we address trait self‐efficacy, trait locus of control, trait self‐
esteem, trait self‐control, implicit beliefs, mind‐body dualism belief, autonomy, and intentionality. We chose
these constructs as they are some of the most widely used constructs in the literature in the theoretical dis-
cussion of agency and are common predictors of behaviors and outcomes (e.g., grouped together as the ‘core
self‐evaluations’ meta‐construct; Judge, Erez, Bono, & Thoresen, 2002; Judge, Locke, & Durham, 1997; Judge &
Bono, 2001), often raised as related conceptualizations of agency in the discussion of the construct of the
belief in free will (see various chapters in Baer, Kaufman, & Baumeister, 2008).4.1 | Dimensions
4.1.1 | Construct type
The belief in free will is a generalized lay‐belief regarding the capacity for human choice – “Do I (and others) have a
choice, and if so, can I (and others) freely choose to do otherwise?”. As a belief, it captures a mental representation
by a believer of the link between an object, in this case humans, and an attribute, in this case “free will”, or the capacity
for choice. Beliefs are generally considered stable, durable, and lasting (Wyer & Goldberg, 1970), although the litera-
ture suggests several mechanisms by which this belief can be temporarily activated or affected (Vohs & Schooler,
2008).
Beliefs differ from evaluations. Evaluations are interpretations and/or attributions of events and behaviors
aimed to explain processes and facilitate an understanding of the world (Heider, 1958). Beliefs are broader
and more stable than evaluations, perceptions, attitudes, or inferences (Wyer & Albarracín, 2005). For example,
in reference to free will, the belief in free will would be “I have free will” whereas an evaluation would be “this
outcome happened because I have free will” (free will attributions; Feldman, Wong, & Baumeister, 2016c) or “I
am experiencing/exercising free will right now” (e.g., sense of agency or the illusion of will; Wegner, 2003, 2004;
Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002). Beliefs are considered the fundamental building blocks of behavior (Ajzen &
Fishbein, 1975) affecting attitudes, intentions, and behavior depending on factors such as belief strength, central-
ity of the belief to the self, retrievability of the belief in a context, and relevance of the belief to the target or
situation.
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patterns of behavior, thoughts, and emotions (McCrae & Costa, 2003; Parks‐Leduc, Feldman, & Bardi, 2015). Traits
are solely focused on a single individual rated by an assessment of a self. In the constructs reviewed below, these
are assessments of perceived ability (self‐efficacy), perceived controllability (self‐control), or perceived worth
(self‐esteem). Beliefs such as the belief in free will, implicit theories, or mind‐body dualism, are more generalized
abstract beliefs about life, across domains, and in reference to human beings in general, both self and others.4.1.2 | Key factor
The belief in free will is different from other constructs in that it conceptualizes agency as being about the capacity for
choice (Davidov & Eisikovits, 2015; Monroe et al., 2014). Laypersons’ exhibit a strong cognitive link between free will
and choice and believers in free will exhibit higher motivation in engaging in choice, lower difficulty in making choices,
and higher satisfaction with choices they made (Feldman et al., 2014). Other constructs focus on other agentic factors,
such as the capacity for successful execution (self‐efficacy), capacity for change (implicit beliefs), capacity for internal
control (self‐control), internal‐external attributions (locus of control), worth (self‐esteem), and independence
(autonomy).
Choice is important, as it is a fundamental factor in the understanding of the human psyche and is considered by
thinkers to be a defining feature of human existence (Heidegger, 1954/1968; Sartre, 1943/1956) and sense of free-
dom (Kant, 1797/1967). Modern capitalist societies generally view choice as positive and desirable and the absence of
choice problematic and negative (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Schwartz, 2004). Using an evolutionary perspective, the per-
ceived capacity for choice, the ability to perceive and evaluate alternatives, weight costs and benefits, and then make
and implement a decision, are all of crucial importance for survival (Brembs, 2011), successful long term goal pursuit
(Seligman, Railton, Baumeister, & Sripada, 2013), behavioral adaptation (Vohs & Baumeister, 2013), and coexistence
and coordination with others (Baumeister, 2008b).4.1.3 | Conceptualization of the person and the environment
The belief in free will differs from other constructs in regards to the conceptualization of the person and the environ-
ment. Belief in free will is focused on agentic choice and therefore makes the distinction between agentic behaviors
and non‐agentic behaviors for the person and a distinction between constraining versus non‐constraining external
factors in the environment. As mentioned above, traits are mostly centered on the individual, with no consideration
of the external environment surrounding the individual. Locus of control, for example, views the individual as a unified
self and all external factors as one external environment, so attributions are made either to a person or to the envi-
ronment. In these trait constructs, genes, personality, as well as a person’s uncontrollable urges and needs are all
evaluated as being part of the self and are factors that may possibly drive more positive self‐evaluations (e.g., "I have
strong gut instincts"; "I have genes that allow me to do this task successfully") but are all perceived as non‐agentic self
and as possible constraints to free will in self (e.g., "I cannot control my gut instincts"; "I cannot choose what I am good
at"). Looking at external factors, the autonomy construct makes a reference to an external environment, but only in
reference to other agents. Similarly, mind‐body dualism and implicit theories are beliefs that are centered on persons
and therefore only consider possible change or perceptions of mind‐body dualism in others.
This distinction regarding agency in the self and of constraints in the environment is of crucial theoretical impor-
tance. Recent reviews of the attribution literature in psychology have highlighted general concerns with attribution
theory as focusing on the distinction between attributions to the self versus attributions to the environment rather
than the distinction between agentic self versus non‐agentic self (Malle, 2011a, 2011b). Researchers have called for
the field to return to the roots of Fritz Heider’s (1944) original conceptualization of human behavior based on the
recent understanding of laypersons’ philosophy of action as differentiating between agentic versus non‐agentic action
(Malle, 2011a, 2011b). The latter differentiation makes a clear distinction between two types of actions that emanate
from the self – actions that are free, intentional, and deliberate and actions that are not. The recent criticism of the
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chology literature now assumes the distinction between these two forms of thinking (Kahneman, 2011). The study of
folk psychology supports the understanding that laypersons evaluate their own actions and the actions of others in a
similar way (Malle & Knobe, 1997a, 1997b). This new direction relates to the differences between belief in free will
and the other constructs as competing conceptualizations regarding the cognitive origins of action. The construct
of the belief in free will directly addresses many of the concerns raised regarding the current conceptualizations of
agency.
4.2 | Comparison to other constructs
4.2.1 | Overview
The belief in free will captures a unique aspect of agency, and several articles have specifically contrasted the belief in
free will against other agency constructs and compared their predictive power for outcomes. Initial conceptual discus-
sion and empirical evidence was provided by the studies validating the free will beliefs scales (Nadelhoffer et al., 2014;
Paulhus & Carey, 2011; Rakos et al., 2008). Feldman, Farh, and Wong (2016b) showed that free will beliefs predicted
outcomes above and beyond trait self‐control, trait locus of control, job self‐efficacy, trait self‐esteem, and implicit
theories, over time and across cultures. Feldman (2014) reported a confirmatory factor analysis showing that a model
with the belief in free will as a separate construct from these other constructs had better fit than a model with the
constructs combined. Stillman et al. (2010) demonstrated that the belief in free will predicted job performance above
and beyond locus of control, intelligence, the big five personality traits, protestant work ethic, and life satisfaction.
Feldman, Chandrashekar, and Wong (2016a) reported that the belief in free will predicted academic achievements
above and beyond implicit beliefs and trait self‐control. In Crescioni, Baumeister, Ainsworth, Ent, and Lambert
(2016), belief in free will predicted positive outcomes above and beyond implicit theories and internal control.
We now proceed to review how the belief in free will differs from and is related to each of the constructs in
greater detail. Table 1 provides a summary of the conceptual differences between belief in free will and the trait con-
structs, and Table 2 provides a summary of the conceptual differences between belief in free will and the lay‐beliefs
and evaluations constructs.
4.2.2 | Trait self‐efficacy
Self‐efficacy is “a judgment of one’s ability to organize and execute given types of performances” (Bandura, 1994), and
as a core self‐evaluation it is referred to as "one’s estimate of one’s fundamental ability to cope, perform, and be
successful" (Judge et al., 1997). Self‐efficacy differs from belief in free will in that it reflects a self‐evaluation of abil-
ities, such as “Do I possess the means to execute this successfully?” or “Can I achieve this?”. Sappington (1990) gives
an example of differences between self‐efficacy and the belief in free by pointing out that one can perceive the self as
incapable and still believe that self is free to choose whether to undertake the action or not.TABLE 1 Summary table of the differences between belief in free will and traits
Free will beliefs
Trait locus
of control
Trait
self‐efficacy
Trait
self‐esteem
Trait
self‐control
Type Belief Trait Trait Trait Trait
Key factor Choice Internal versus
external
attributions
Internal ability Internal worth Internal
controllability
View of the
person
Agentic vs.
non‐agentic self
One self Capable versus
incapable self
Valued versus
unvalued self
Controlled versus
uncontrolled self
View of the
environment
Constraining vs.
allowing factors
One external
environment
(not considered) (not considered) (not considered)
TABLE 2 Summary table of the differences between belief in free will, lay‐beliefs, and evaluations
Free will beliefs Implicit theories Mind‐body dualism Intentionality Autonomy
Type Belief Belief Belief Evaluation Evaluation
Key factor Choice Capacity for
change
Controllability Intentions Independence
from other
agents
View of the
person
Agentic vs.
non‐agentic self
Changing vs.
fixed self
Mind vs. or
with body
Intended vs.
unintended
actions of
the self
One self
View of the
environment
Constraining vs.
allowing
environment
Changing vs.
fixed others
Mind vs. or with
body in others
Intended versus
unintended
actions of
others
All other agents
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and Brass (2011) suggested that free will beliefs affect intentional effort through perceived control and self‐efficacy.
Crescioni et al. (2016) reported a moderate positive relationship between beliefs in free will and self‐efficacy
(r = 0.35).4.2.3 | Trait locus of control
Locus of control is a construct that aims to capture the extent to which people tend to attribute outcomes to inter-
nal versus external causes (Rotter, 1966). Those with an internal locus of control tend to perceive the self as the
cause of an outcome while those with an external locus of control attribute the cause of events to external
determinants.
The belief in free will and locus of control are different constructs (Paulhus & Carey, 2011; Rakos et al., 2008;
Stillman et al., 2010; Stroessner & Green, 1990; Waldman, Viney, Bell, Bennett, & Hess, 1983). Locus of control
focuses on the distinction between internal and external attributions, regardless of agency. Furthermore, locus of con-
trol is an evaluation of the connection between actions taken by the self and outcomes observed, whereas the belief
in free will is mainly focused on the origins of action and perceived choice of enacting, regardless of whether these
actions led to a desired result or had an impact.
Empirically, the reported correlations between the two constructs in the literature range from very weak (Rakos
et al., 2008 high‐school student sample: no effect; Stroessner & Green, 1990: r = 0.03) to moderate (Crescioni et al.,
2016: r = 0.28; Rakos et al., 2008 college sample: r = 0.22 to 0.33; Stillman et al., 2010: r = 0.23; Waldman et al., 1983:
r = 0.17).4.2.4 | Trait self‐esteem
Self‐esteem is a construct that aims to capture the overall value that one places on oneself as a person, reflecting
the self‐worth evaluative component of self‐concept capturing how people feel about themselves (Leary &
Baumeister, 2000). Several definitions of self‐esteem make references to evaluations of the self as compared to
perceptions others’ worth (Baumeister & Boden, 1998). The differences between self‐esteem and belief in free will
are most apparent when examining items used in common self‐esteem measures (Rosenberg, 1965), such as “I am
able to do things as well as most other people” or “I feel that I’m a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with
others” which include aspects of both (a) how well one does, and (b) a comparison to how well most other people
do or have done in the past. Belief in free will has no evaluations or judgments of worth about agents or actions, it
merely refers to the capacity for choice and not for quality of execution. It makes no comparison between self and
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eralized stable rule.
Linking between the two constructs, belief in free will has been found to hold a weak to moderate positive rela-
tionship with self‐esteem (Alquist, Ainsworth, Baumeister, Daly, & Stillman, 2015: r = 0.17; Rakos et al., 2008: r = 0.26
to 0.29) and has been shown to predict outcomes above and beyond self‐esteem (Alquist et al., 2015).4.2.5 | Trait self‐control
Self‐control generally refers to the capacity to regulate behavior, thoughts, and emotions by sustaining, altering,
amplifying or overriding natural impulses, urges, and desires (de Ridder, Lensvelt‐Mulders, Finkenauer, Stok, &
Baumeister, 2012), associated with a conscious exertion of effort needed to resist, manipulate or overcome oneself
(Vohs & Baumeister, 2004). Trait self‐control is typically measured using items about the capacity for self‐discipline,
concentration, effective pursuit of long‐term goals, and fighting off temptations (Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone,
2004).
There are conceptual links between belief in free will and self‐control. Self‐control allows the person to overcome
some internal constraints that limit free will, such as urges, needs, temptations, and desires, and therefore some argue
that self‐control, together with the capacity for rational choice, are two adaptive forms of expressing free will
(Baumeister, 2008a; Baumeister & Monroe, 2014). This seems to correspond to laypersons’ notions of free will per-
ceiving actions to be most free when they involve resistance to pressure, deliberate conscious thought, and rational
choice (Baumeister, Sparks, Stillman, & Vohs, 2008). Therefore, a person with a higher capacity for self‐control may
perceive oneself as being less constrained and therefore as having more free will. The relationship may be bi‐
directional, in that those who believe in free will would exhibit higher capacity for self‐control or the motivation
to exert it to maximize their potential for freedom of action. Studies have indeed shown that belief in free will is
associated with better self‐control (Clarkson et al., 2015; Rigoni, Kühn, Gaudino, Sartori, & Brass, 2012).
However, self‐control and belief in free will are not one. Self‐control focuses on a specific set of internal con-
straints (temptations, desires, urges, needs, etc.), whereas belief in free will includes freedom from all constraints
(genes, personality, disorders, etc.). Moreover, the belief in free will refers to the inherent capacity for choice of over-
riding possible constraints, while self‐control is typically about the exertion of effort to override constraints. In that
sense, the belief in free will can be conceptualized as the perceived capacity of whether or not to exert self‐control
and the way to do so (Feldman, Chandrashekar, & Wong, 2016a; Rigoni et al., 2012). Metaphorically, belief in free will
can be viewed as enabling the self to choose a desired direction and to change directions when necessary, whereas
self‐control facilitates the long‐term pursuit of a chosen direction, and the combination of the two may lead to optimal
goal pursuit.
Belief in free will and self‐control do not always align and it is possible for a person to have high belief in free will
and exhibit low self‐control. For example – there are situations in which agents deliberately choose to “let go” and give
in to temptations in order to fulfill some goal (Kivetz & Simonson, 2002), like when feeling distressed and wanting to
indulge the self in order to feel better (Tice, Bratslavsky, & Baumeister, 2001). It is also possible for a person to have
high trait self‐control but show relatively low endorsement of the belief in free will (e.g., Asian samples in Feldman,
Chandrashekar, & Wong, 2016a). For example, some religious believers display high levels of self‐control but view
the future as pre determined by God and their choices constrained, and many scientists demonstrate high levels of
self‐control but tend to view all actions as predetermined by scientific rules of nature.4.2.6 | Implicit beliefs
Implicit theories reflect the belief in fixed versus malleable human attributes (Dweck, 1996; Dweck, Chiu, & Hong,
1995) addressing the agentic capacity for change. People generally fall into two main groups endorsing different
implicit theories – the entity theorists who believe that human attributes are fixed, and incremental theorists who
see human attributes as malleable. Measures of implicit lay‐theories typically ask participants to indicate their
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change that” endorsed by entity theorists as opposed to “anyone can change even their most basic qualities” endorsed
by incrementalists (Levy, Stroessner, & Dweck, 1998). Implicit theories have been shown to affect attitudes, percep-
tions, and behaviors (Dweck, 1999; Levy, Plaks, Hong, Chiu, & Dweck, 2001), so that – for example – entitists may use
categories of race to explain someone’s behavior and expect behavior to be predictable and stable while incremental-
ists would expect behavior to vary between situations (Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997b).
There are several important differences between implicit theories and belief in free will, and those have been
discussed across several studies examining the links between the two (Crescioni et al., 2016; Dweck & Molden,
2008; Feldman, Chandrashekar, &, Wong, 2016a; Nadelhoffer & Matveeva, 2009). First, implicit theories focus on
malleability and capacity for change, the degree to which a person perceives a specific domain atypical or that a
change in human behavior is at all possible (Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin, & Wan, 1999). Whereas belief in free will focuses
on the capacity for free choice, and in relation to change – whether a person perceives that self can choose whether
to change or not. Therefore, one can perceive that change is possible (incrementalists) but perceive that change is not
under one’s own control (low belief in free will).
Second, implicit theories are typically viewed as domain specific, focusing on a single category of constraints to
free will (e.g., intelligence and personality; Blackwell, Trzesniewski, & Dweck, 2007; Chiu, Dweck, Tong, & Fu,
1997). Belief in free will addresses all causal determinants combined. Studies on racial lay‐theories, for example,
argued that people’s views of race as malleable or not are crucial to interpretations made of others’ behaviors in
reference to their racial category. Belief in free will considers race, or any other essentialized category as just one
of the many possible constraints on one’s behavior. The belief that people do not have to follow the stereotypical
behavior of their category or that the category is malleable does not imply that they perceive agents to be free of
other constraints. Therefore, incrementalists can hold low beliefs in free will because of external constraints not cap-
tured by implicit theories.
Empirical evidence suggests no relationship to a weak relationship between free will beliefs and implicit theories,
and free will beliefs predicted outcomes above and beyond implicit theories (Crescioni et al., 2016: r = −0.03; Feldman
et al., 2016: r = 0.03 to −0.25).
4.2.7 | Mind‐body dualism beliefs
Mind‐body dualism is the belief that the mind and the body are not one, in that beyond the body exists some non‐
physical entity (spirit, soul, etc.) which is somehow related to the body. Dualism beliefs are widespread, especially
in religious thought, and in relation to ideas such as the afterlife (the existence of the mind after the body ceases
to exist). Dualism has long been debated by philosophers, at times with references to the debate on free will, yet
the two debates regarding the existence of free will and of dualism are not the same. Our discussion above of what
the belief in free will is and what it is not concluded that the lay‐belief in free will is not grounded in metaphysical
notions, but on the concept of choice, and the empirical evidence is in support of weak to no correlations between
the two (Forstmann, Burgmer, & Mussweiler, 2012: r = 0.01 to −0.17). For example, Nadelhoffer et al. (2014) provided
a discussion of the differences and an in‐depth empirical demonstration using factor analysis and concluded dualism
(or, non‐reductionism) as a separate factor than free will beliefs. Nahmias et al. (2014) further showed that laypersons
do not understand free will as dualism, and therefore neuroscience evidence connecting between the mind and the
body (Preston, Ritter, & Hepler, 2013) does not seem to affect beliefs in free will.
4.2.8 | Autonomy
Like free will, the concept of autonomy has also been a focus of heated philosophical debate and at the center of con-
troversy for long. Scholars have defined the concept of autonomy in different ways, yet most converge on seeing
autonomy as regulation of the self by the self, congruent behavior that could be endorsed and fully identified as
enacted by the self and not by others (Ryan & Deci, 2006). Perceptions of autonomy are based on high‐order reflec-
tions that enable a person to maintain a separate identity and meaning from other agents (Deci & Ryan, 1987).
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sensitivity to others, and self‐efficacy (Bekker & van Assen, 2006; Deci & Ryan, 1985). Measures of autonomy in a
context such as job autonomy include items referring to independence and freedom from rules or agents in making
contextual decisions (e.g., Barrick &Mount, 1993; Oldham & Hackman, 1981; Spector & Fox, 2003). Hence, autonomy
reflects an overall perception in regards to the capacity or the ability to act without constraints from others in a social
environment.
Though free will beliefs are conceptually related to perceived autonomy, there are several distinctions. Autonomy
mainly refers to the self as maintaining a separate and independent self from other agents, without addressing the
many other types of constraints to free will, either external or internal. In that sense, autonomy is mainly about the
person’s behavior in social environments and the interplay between the self and others, between a need for related-
ness to others and the need for maintaining autonomy, often involving the exercise of self‐regulation (Reis, Sheldon,
Gable, Roscoe, & Ryan, 2000). Autonomy is also person and context specific and less of a general belief about humans
overall. Therefore, feelings of autonomy can change by simply changing the context in which the individual operates,
and perceptions of autonomy in one context are not necessarily indicative of perceptions of autonomy in another.
To give an example of the differences – even with strict instructions on working with minimal discretion indicative
of low granted autonomy, individuals with a strong belief in free will can still perceive their own ability to choose
whether to adhere, to choose how to adhere, or to choose to move to an environment that will grant more autonomy.
Also, employees might be granted high degrees of autonomy from their superior, yet they might feel that they are not
completely in control of their own actions, driven by deterministic internal factors or that their lives are driven by
external influences such as God or fate, preventing them from capitalizing on their granted autonomy.
4.2.9 | Intent/Intentionality
Intentionality (or intent) in the context of behavior and cognition refers to the mental representation of purposeful
action, meaning an action is perceived as deliberately taken to lead to a certain outcome. Because both intent and free
will are considered important factors in attributions of blame, the two are sometimes used interchangeably, but attri-
butions of intent and free will are conceptually and empirically different (Feldman, Wong, & Baumeister, 2016c).
Intent is perceived as a purely internal process regarding whether an agent intended for a certain outcome to happen
or not, while free will is about the capacity to choose otherwise free from internal and external constraints. Intent is
focused on outcomes, whether an agent knew and understood the connection between the action and the outcome
and was deliberately affecting that outcome, while free will is focused on the capacity to act in the situation, focusing
on the circumstances of the decision or behavior and not its consequence. People generally tend to have a clear judg-
ment of whether they intended for something to happen, while the question of free will is less certain as it is tied to a
more generalized belief about life factors that are less understood or controlled. There is growing empirical work that
attempts to examine how free will beliefs are related to readiness potential, motor preparation, or intentional binding,
aiming to further clarify the experiences of free will and of action‐outcome connections (Aarts & van den Bos, 2011;
Kühn & Brass, 2009; Rigoni et al., 2011; Rigoni, Wilquin, Brass, & Burle, 2013; Soon, He, Bode, & Haynes, 2013), yet
there needs to be a clearer differentiation between the concept of free will (or free choice, or voluntary action) and
intentionality (or intent) in the literature, recognizing the important conceptual nuances.5 | CONCLUSION
The last decade has seen the rise of research on folk philosophy and lay‐beliefs, identifying the belief in free will as an
important predictor of outcomes, yet some confusion remains regarding the construct and its positioning within the
existing literature. In this review, we argued that the belief in free will captures unique aspects of agency that go
beyond and complement other well‐known agency‐related constructs in the literature – self‐efficacy, locus of control,
self‐esteem, self‐control, implicit theories, mind‐body dualism, autonomy, and intentionality. We provided an
FELDMAN 11 of 15overview of the conceptual differences and the empirical evidence highlighting this belief as a distinct and important
construct. We call on future research to pay close attention to these differences and to leverage the potential in the
emerging construct of the belief in free will.NOTE
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about whether laypersons generally consider free will as compatible with determinism or not (Feltz & Cova, 2014), yet that
debate often unnecessarily complicates references to laybeliefs about free will as the joint definition seems relevant
regardless of the views on compatibilism. This review deliberately refrains from references to this debate or to determinism
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